Northern Illinois University Law Review
Volume 29

Issue 1

Article 4

11-1-2008

The Urgent Reawakening of the Assyrian Question in an Emerging
Iraqi Federalism: The Self-Determination of the Assyrian People
Paul A. Isaac

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr
Part of the Law Commons

Suggested Citation
Paul A. Isaac, Comment, The Urgent Reawakening of the Assyrian Question in an Emerging Iraqi
Federalism: The Self-Determination of the Assyrian People,29 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 209 (2008).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Huskie Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Northern Illinois University Law Review by an authorized editor of Huskie Commons. For
more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

The Urgent Reawakening of the Assyrian
Question in an Emerging Iraqi Federalism:
The Self-Determination of the Assyrian
People
1.

II.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................

210

WHO ARE ASSYRIANS? ...............................................................
211
B.
THE PRESENT WARTIME IMPACT UPON ASSYRIANS ................... 212
HISTORICAL CONTEXT ...................................................................... 215
A.
A.

THE ASSYRIAN QUESTION AND THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD
WA R I ......................................................................................... 2 15
B.
SUFFERING UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN ....................................... 218
HI. LEGAL STANDARDS .......................................................................... 219
A.
POLITICAL HISTORY ................................................................... 219
B.
SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ....................... 221
C.
DEFINING THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES .................... 223

1.

D.
E.

Peoples ..............................................................................

223

Determination ...................................................................
224
AN EXPANDING INDIGENOUS APPLICATION ............................... 226
2.

IRA QI LAW .................................................................................

1.
2.

228

Assyrians in Iraqi Law ......................................................
228
InternationalIncorporationand IraqiLaw ...................... 229

IV. THE ASSYRIANS: AN ARGUMENT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION .....
231
A.
ASSYRIANS ARE A DISTINCT PEOPLE ......................................... 231
B.
HOW AN AUTONOMY-BASED SOLUTION PROVIDES A PLAUSIBLE
GRANT OF DETERMINATION ...................................................... 233

1.

2.

A rticle 125 .........................................................................

InternationalLaw ..............................................................

234

237

C.
THE KURDISH PARALLEL ........................................
237
D.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF AUTONOMY .................................. 239
E.
CRITICISMS AND RESPONSES ..................................................... 241
V . C ONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 242
VI. A PPEN DIX .......................................................................................... 243
A.
MAP OF THE SUGGESTED ASSYRIAN ADMINISTRATIVE AREA IN
THE NINEVEH GOVERNATE ........................................................ 243

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 29

We are a people torn apart from era to era, from
country to country, yet all of us have maintained hope in
the midst of hopeless and senseless situations. In the midst
of these circumstances we have tried to hold onto physical
life amid psychological demise. In the face of ache, anguish, and anxiety of living in so many uncertain situations
and in so many foreign lands where hopes unborn have
died, we have firmly believed that justice buried will rise
again .... 1

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Assyrian Question has now reemerged with a sense of gravity and
urgency that have not been felt since the immediate aftermath of World
War I. The status of the Assyrians-an ancient ethnic and religious minority of Iraq-has currently come into question regarding the effect of key
provisions in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution. The gravity of the situation stems,
foremost, from observing a rapid Assyrian exodus. Based on being deliberately targeted and attacked, Assyrians have fled Iraq en masse. The urgency
of the situation recalls the historical neglect of Assyrians in the diplomatic
arena. Many Assyrians fear that, as in the past, claims of Assyrian rights
and recognitions will be either ignored, or simply drowned out by a more
powerful political cacophony. History justifiably suggests that mere promises of protection are insufficient, and therefore, something greater and
more tangible is required, before it is too late.
This comment argues that Assyrians are an indigenous people under
international law and are therefore entitled to the full exercise of their internal political and cultural self-determination. In order to effectuate this right,
some heightened form of federally-based self-administration would be appropriate because such solutions are consistent with both Iraqi and international law. Part I of this article introduces Assyrians and the grave impact
that the current war in Iraq has had on them. Part II elaborates on the Assyrian Question as a broad theme in contemporary Assyrian history and principle backdrop of the current struggle for Assyrian rights and protections in
Iraq. Part III surveys the law of the self-determination of peoples and corresponding remedies, in particular, forms of federally-based autonomy. Additionally, this section surveys the Iraqi Constitution with a focus on the provisions relevant to Assyrian rights. Part IV argues that Assyrians are a people who are entitled to self-determination on account of their distinct historical, linguistic, and ethnic features. Next, several autonomy-based pro1.

19:23-25.

PETER H. TALIA, BETWEEN HOPE AND HOPELESSNESS 23 (1985); see also Isaiah
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posals are briefly surveyed and then broadly defended as being consistent
with international law and the Iraqi constitutional framework. A form of
increased territorial-based self-governance will be further defended on the
ground that it can promote democratic stability, provide critical protections
to a vulnerable population, and enhance economic equity due to historical
deprivations. Lastly, two criticisms of autonomy-based proposals will be
summarized and then answered.
A.

WHO ARE ASSYRIANS?

Since the fall of the ancient Assyrian Empire, Assyrians have remained in Iraq for the past two thousand five hundred years.2 It has been a
continuous and rich, yet often burdensome and suffering heritage. Descending from the ancient Assyrian Empire, modern Assyrians possess a distinct
ethnicity. 3 As such, Assyrians constitute the Aramaic-speaking Christians
who live in Iraq, the Middle East, and throughout the world.4 Worldwide,5
the Assyrian ethnic population has been estimated at nearly 4.25 million.
Today within Iraq, Assyrians constitute approximately three percent of the
2.
See generally FREDERICK A. APRIM, ASSYRIANS: FROM BEDR KHAN TO SADDAM
HUSSEIN: DRIVING INTO ExTINCTION THE LAST ARAMAIC SPEAKERS (2006); Simo Parpola,

National and Ethnic Identity in the Neo-Assyrian Empire and Assyrian Identity in PostEmpire Times, 18 J. OF ASSYRIAN AcAD. STUD. 5 (2004) (discussing the continuity of the

ancient and modem Assyrians); Vahram Petrosian, Assyrians in Iraq, 10 IRAN & CAUCASUS
113 (2006).
3.

W.A. WIGRAM, THE ASSYRIANS AND THEIR NEIGHBORS 178-79 (photo. reprint

n.d.) (1929).
4.
The use of the term "Assyrian" raises a broad array of issues in regard to ethnic
identity. The first issue is that Assyrian, an ethnicity, is commonly confused with Syrian,
nationals of the country Syria. See, e.g., Mansour v. I.N.S., 230 F.3d 902, 907-09 (7th Cir.
2000) (remanding a Board of Immigration Appeals decision because the board mistakenly
classified the plaintiff as a Syrian Christian, rather than an Assyrian Christian). Another
significant issue involved with the term Assyrian is that it has been used pejoratively to refer
to Chaldeans and Arameans who, in some measure, consider themselves as distinct from
Assyrians.
See
generally Names
of Syrian Christians, in
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Names ofSyriacChristians (last visited Sept. 8, 2008). The
debate between Assyrians and Chaldeans arguably originates from the split of the Uniat
Church from the Nestorians, by which that group sought to distinguish themselves from the
Nestorian Church and the heresy associated with Nestorius. See JOHN JOSEPH, THE
NESTORIANS AND THEIR MUSLIM NEIGHBORS 10 (1961). Reflecting important unities, modern
political terminology still retains the distinction by the use of the terms "Chaldo-Assyrian"
or "Assyro-Chaldo." See infra note 39. Resolving longstanding demarcations over ethnic
terminology is beyond the scope of this comment. For the purposes here, the inclusive classification of being both Aramaic speaking and historically Christian captures the essence of a
right of self-determination as belonging to the Assyrian people because language, religion,
and relative historical continuity constitute the centrally unifying features of all these groups.
5.
ETHNOLOGuE: LANGUAGES OF THE WORLD 442-43 (Raymond G. Gordon et al.
eds., 15th ed. 2005) [hereinafter ETHNOLOGUE].

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 29

6
population, concentrating mainly in the Nineveh Plains in northern Iraq.
Outside Iraq, a vast number of other Assyrians are dispersed throughout the
world in numerous countries.7
Several characteristics differentiate Assyrians from their surrounding
culture. Whereas the predominant regional language is Arabic, Assyrians
speak a native language commonly known as Assyrian, neo-Aramaic, or
Syriac. 8 It is a pre-Arabic language that derives directly from Aramaic, the
ancient linguafrancaof the Middle East, and further descends from ancient
Akkadian. 9 In addition, whereas the majority religion of Iraq is Islam, Assyrians have been overwhelmingly Christian and, in fact, possess a Christian heritage that traces to the Apostolic Era. 10 Often, it has specifically
been on account of their religion that Assyrians have been subjected to particular torments and persecutions." Finally, Assyrians are distinct because,
by inhabiting Iraq and surrounding regions continuously for thousands of
years, it can be reasonably claimed that the Assyrians possess an indigenous
heritage. 12

B.

THE PRESENT WARTIME IMPACT UPON ASSYRIANS

In light of the turmoil in Iraq, Assyrians, as Iraqi Christians, have experienced a unique set of personal threats that severely jeopardize their future survival in Iraq.' 3 Recently Michael Cromartie, the Chair of the U.S.
6.
CIA, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/iz.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2007) [hereinafter CIA Factbook]; see also
KERIM YILDIZ, THE KURDS INIRAQ PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 51 (2007).

7.
ETHNOLOGUE, supra note 5, at 442-43; Languages of the World: Aramaic,
http://www.nvtc.gov/1otw/months/august/Aramaic.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2007).
8.
THE WORLD'S MAJOR LANGUAGES 656 (Bernard Comrie ed., 1987) [hereinafter
LANGUAGES].

9.

Id.

10.
J.F. COAKLEY, THE CHURCH OF THE EAST AND THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND: A
HISTORY OF THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY'S ASSYRIAN MISSION 5-6 (1992); SURMA
D'BAIT MAR SHIMUN, ASSYRIAN CHURCH CUSTOMS AND THE MURDER OF MAR SHIMUN

(photo. reprint 1983) (1920); CIA Factbook, supra note 6 (stating that Iraq is 97% Muslim).
11.
See discussion infra Parts I.B, II.A-B.
12.
See discussion infra Part IV.A. Assyrians need not claim the status of being the
sole indigenous people of Iraq in order to claim their right to self-determination under the
current indigenous peoples conventions.
13.

U.N. SEC. COUNCIL, U.N. ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR IRAQ [UNAMI], HUMAN

RIGHTS REPORT 1 APRIL-30 JUNE 2007 IN 30-32 (n.d.); The Plight of Religious Minorities:
Can Religious Pluralism Survive?: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Africa, Global Human
Rights and International Operations of the H. Comm. on InternationalRelations, 109th
Cong. 58-88 (2006) (statement of Ms. Rosie Malek-Yonan, Author, The Crimson Field)
(discussing the gravity of the Assyrian predicament and providing extensive documentation
of Assyrian victimization); To Provide Special Immigrant Status for Certain Iraqis, to Assist
Iraqi Refugees, and for Other Purposes, H.R. 2265, 110th Cong. (2007); Expressing Concern
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Commission on International Religious Freedom, summarized the urgency
of the problems that Assyrians face in Iraq as a vulnerable Christian minority:
While all Iraqis are threatened by violence, the non-Muslim
minorities face particularized forms of harassment and
abuse; what is more, these groups appear to suffer a degree
of violent attacks and other human rights abuses disproportionate to their numbers.

Faced with these harsh realities, thousands of members of Iraqi religious minorities have fled the country,
seeking refuge in neighboring states and among growing
diaspora communities in the West. According to some reports, nearly half of Iraq's indigenous Christian population
is now living outside the country. Although comprising
only 4-5 percent of Iraq's pre-war population, the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports1 that
almost
4
40 percent of registered refugees are Christians.
Assyrian suffering has been disproportionate and has occurred on the
basis of their minority ethnic and religious status.' 5 Alarmingly, Assyrians6
face threats from many actors and in various geographical regions of Iraq.'
In particular, Assyrian churches in Baghdad have been bombed, and clergy

for the Status of the Assyrian People in Post-War Iraq, H.R. Res. 272, 108th Cong. (2003);
see also Expressing Concern for the Plight of Assyrians in the Near East, H.R. Res. 332,
105th Cong. (1997); Kevin Walsh, Victims of a Growing Crisis: A Call for Reform of the
United States Immigration Law and Policy Pertainingto Refugees of the Iraq War, 53 VILL.
L. REV. 421,423-28 (2008).
14.
Letter from Michael Cromartie, Chairman, U.S. Comm'n on Int'l Religious
Freedom, to Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec'y of State (Sept. 5, 2007); see also Letter from
Barack Obama, U.S. Senator-Illinois, to Condoleeza Rice, U.S. Sec'y of State (Sept. 29,
2008) (on file with author) (reiterating "concern about the safety and well-being of Iraq's
Christian and other non-Muslim religious minorities . . . [such as] Catholic Chaldeans,
Syriac Orthdox, [and] Assyrian[s]").
15.
While Assyrians are amongst the suffering minorities in Iraq, they are not the
only one. Others such as Yezidis, Turkomen, and Armenians are also susceptible. The
Yezidis, for example, a syncretistic minority religious group, have also been subject to violent attack, one in which more than 200 were killed. James Glanz, Iraq Toll Reaches 250 in
the DeadliestAttack of the War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2007, at A6.
16.
DEP'T. OF STATE, 109TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 2005, at 1866 (Comm. Print 2006).
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and civilians viciously murdered.1 7 Furthermore, civilians have been kidnapped, held for ransom, and often killed.18 Many Assyrians have been
driven from their villages after the institution of jizya, the Islamic tax often
levied on non-Muslims, which has been instituted under the threat of conversion or death in places such as Dora.' 9 Often, also because Assyrians are
Christians, they are seen as being aligned with the
"Western enemy," and
2°
this intensifies their targeting by insurgent groups.
Assyrians have suffered discrimination in employment as well, and
many of their businesses have been targeted for violence. 2 Though democratic voting has been instituted in Iraq, Assyrians attempting to vote have
often been blocked or intimidated from effective participation.2 2 In addition,
there have been longstanding issues of unresolved land possession cases.2 3
Many Assyrian families have had their lands seized by squatters and lack
adequate remedies. 24 Now that many more Assyrians have fled, if they return, the restoration of their properties remains a serious question.
Many of the funds from the United States that have been targeted for
redevelopment have been inequitably distributed to Assyrians. Recently, in
congressional hearings on the distribution of reconstruction funds, Representative Diane Watson characterized this problem as "apartheid-like dedevelopment of an ethnic community," that was, in effect, leading to the deChristianization of certain areas, such as the Nineveh Plains.25

17.

U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 39 (2007);

Assyrian Boy Beheaded, Burned in North Iraq, ASSYRIAN INT'L NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 6,
2004, http://www.aina.org/news/20041006144824.htm; Iraq: Kidnapping of Archbishop
Highlights Christians' Plight, ASSYRIAN

INT'L

NEWS

AGENCY,

Jan.

18,

2005,

http://www.aina.org/news/20050118123047.htm; Colin McMahon, Gunmen Abduct Mosul
Archbishop; GIs, Iraqi Police Killed in Separate Attacks, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 18, 2005, § 1, at 1;
Alex Rodriguez, Blasts Hit Iraq ChristianChurches, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 2, 2004, § 1, at 1.
18.

U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (2005)

("[T]he kidnapping epidemic in Iraq has disproportionately targeted Iraqi Christians.").
19.
Liz Sly, Baghdad Christian District Besieged: Many Flee Dora as Militants
Insist on Islam or Death, CHI. TRIB., May 9, 2007, § 1, at 1.
20.
21.
PRACTICES
22.

U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 34 (2003).
DEP'T. OF STATE, 109TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
2004, at 1829 (Comm. Print 2005).
DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 16, at 186 1; see also DEP'T OF STATE, supra note

21, at 1826 (stating the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq "faced intimidation by
rejectionists[, ... [and] in [the] Ninewah Province received death threats").
23.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CLAIMS IN CONFLICT: REVERSING ETHNIC CLEANSING IN

24.

DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 16, at 1857.

NORTHERN IRAQ 43 (2004), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/iraq0804/iraq0804.pdf.

25.
Hearing on Iraq Reconstruction Before H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th
Cong. 76-79 (2007).
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Targeting, abuse, and hostility have driven massive numbers of Assyrians and other Christians into exodus. 26 The situation remains in crisis proportions and without intervention, the future of Assyrians in Iraq remains in
serious jeopardy. The present fear is based upon what is happening and
what has happened to Assyrians historically.2 7 A brief survey will show
why Assyrian people have reason to take such threats with the utmost seriousness.
H.
A.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

THE ASSYRIAN QUESTION AND THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR I

The Assyrian Question was the phrase given to the inquiry of resolving the suspended and indeterminate status of the Assyrians during the nation-building period which followed World War 1.28 Similar questions were
raised regarding other minorities, many of whom also suffered grave persecution under the Ottoman Empire. 29 Discussing the Assyrian Question entails the summary of a few principle points.
At the forefront of the discussion is the fact that Assyrians suffered
genocide under the Ottoman Turks and lost nearly two-thirds of their total
population over the course of the Great War. 30 Along with the Armenians,
Assyrians, as a similarly vulnerable Christian minority, were targeted for
utter annihilation. 31 Renowned British historian Arnold Toynbee has extensively documented the evidence of the atrocities committed against Assyrians and Armenians and affirms the charge that the Turks "did their best to

A17;

26.

Yochi J. Dreazen, Iraq Sees Christian Exodus, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2004,

at

Michael Luo, Iraq's Christian Minority Flees as Extremist Threat Worsens, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006, at Al; Katherine Zoepf, The Reach of War: Exodus, Many Christians

Flee Iraq, with Syria the Haven of Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2004, at A11.
27.
See discussion infra Part II.A-B.
28.

See JOSEPH YACOUB, THE ASSYRIAN QUESTION (1986).

29.
There is also such a thing as the Armenian Question, and more generally, the
Eastern Question. The Armenian case is dealt with most authoritatively in VAHAKN N.
DADRIAN, THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE: ETHNIC CONFLICT FROM THE BALKANS TO ANATOLIA TO
THE CAUCASUS 21 (2003); also see Vahakn N. Dadrian, The Historicaland Legal Interconnections Between the Armenian Genocide and the Jewish Holocaust: From Impunity to
Retributive Justice, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 503 (1998).
30.
THE ASSYRIAN TRAGEDY 7, 13 (photo. reprint 1988) (1934) [hereinafter
TRAGEDY] (though the book is published anonymously, the author is believed to be Patriarch
Mar Eshai Shimun XXIII).

31.

Press Release, Int'l Ass'n of Genocide Scholars, Genocide Scholars Association

Officially Recognizes Assyrian, Greek Genocides (Dec. 16, 2007) (on file with author); see
also NINOS WARDA, SEYFO; THE ASSYRIAN GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (argu-

ing that the Assyrian massacres of World War I constituted the crime of genocide under the
genocide conventions).
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wipe out the Syriac element in the population-the Nestorian Christians of
Urmia." 32 Another scholar solemnly characterizes the memory and public
perceptions of these genocides noting that while
the Armenian tragedy . . . became "the forgotten genocide[,]" [i]t should be remembered that at the same time the
Turks destroyed the Armenians they wiped out other minority populations, albeit considerably smaller in size, like
the Assyrians. They have become even more forgotten by
the world, and their destruction has become "the obliterated
genocide. 33
This took on an even more tragic proportion since Assyrians believed
they would be compensated by the Allies for their loyalty to them, and for
the price that the small and suffering nation paid during the war. Assyrians
fought for the Allies during World War I as well trained military regiments
known as Levies. 34 These Assyrians fought against hostile Ottoman forces
and Kurdish sympathizers in northern Iraq and southern Turkey, providing
a small but effective military force.35 In part, such fierce loyalty was based
on representations made to them by the Allied powers, particularly the British, that when the Allies won the war, the Assyrian people would have their
national interests guarded and represented. 36 After the war, however, Assyrian dignitaries pleaded for national rights at the Paris Peace Conference and
beyond, but to no avail.37 It became increasingly clear that the promises
made to Assyrians had effectively been nullified.
Assyrians, along with other minorities whose hopes of nationhood
were dashed, subsequently became privy to slack human rights protections
32.
A.J. TOYNBEE, TURKEY: A PAST AND A FUTURE 32 (1917).
33.
YAIR AURON, THE BANALITY OF INDIFFERENCE (2000); see also PETER BALKIAN,
THE BURNING TIGRIS: THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND AMERICA'S RESPONSE (2003) (affirming Assyrians were among the minority of small nationalities severely persecuted by the
Ottomans).
34.
WIGRAM, supra note 3, at 223.
TRAGEDY, supra note 30, at 13.
35.
36.
The author of The Assyrian Tragedy quotes Sir Percy Cox, a high official of the
British Empire, as follows:
The Assyrians, who numbered about 35,000, were the more important
element for they had been recognized [sic] as Allies by Great Britain in
the War, and had been used by her in the campaign of 1919 in Kurdistan.
A definite promise of settlement under a benevolent, if not a British
government, had been made to them, and their land, if not within our
administered area, was at least on the immediate frontier.
TRAGEDY, supra note 30, at 14.
37.
Frederick A. Aprim, Assyrians in World War I Treaties: Paris, Sdvres, and
Lausanne, ASSYRIAN STAR, Spring 2006, at 14-16.
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enacted under Turkish and Arab sovereignty.3 8 Initially, limited recognition
during the reconstruction period was given to Assyrians in the Treaty of
S~vres, which stated, in pertinent part, that the new power structure should
"contain full safeguards for the protection of the Assyro-Chaldeans and
other racial or religious minorities within these areas." 39 The Treaty of
S~vres, however, was superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne, which lacked
40
such an express recognition of Assyrian human rights status. Such an
omission, combined with weak guarantees of protection, constituted the
"backward stagger ... which left the Christian populations of Asia Minor at
,,41
the mercy of their old oppressors.
Assyrian delegations continued to unsuccessfully petition for Assyrian
rights at the League of Nations. 42 As the British Mandate ended, the sovereignty of Iraq shifted to the Arabs while the Turks maintained control of
many of the northern areas skirting the north of Iraq. Some British officials
still circulated the possibility of some independent self-governing Assyrian
enclaves in Iraq.4 3 A volatile relationship, however, existed between the
Assyrians and the Iraqi government who opposed Assyrian selfgovernance. Not long after, General Bakr Sidqi ordered the invidious massacre of Assyrian civilians at Semele. 44 The subsequent accounts were horrific. For example, one account states:
The inoffensive population was indiscriminately massacred, men, women and children alike, with rifle, revolver,
Priests were tortured and their
and machine gun fire ....
bodies mutilated. Those who showed their Iraqi nationality
papers were the first to be shot. Girls were raped and
women violated and made to march naked before the Arab
army commander. Holy books were used as fuel for burning girls. Children were run over by military cars. Pregnant
women were bayoneted. Children were flung in the air and
38.

See

41.

2 DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE PEACE TREATIES 1351 (1938).

THOMAS D. MUSGRAVE, SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL MINORITIES

32, 55-57 (1997) (discussing the "breakdown of the minorities treaties regime").
39. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers and Turkey art. 62, Aug. 10, 1920,
T.S. No. 11.
40. Treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, 49 Stat. 2692, 8 L.N.T.S. 1133.
42.

Phillip C. Zane & Waleeta Canon, The League of Nations and the Quest for an

Assyrian Homeland, ASSYRIAN STAR, Spring 2006, at 24.
43. John Joseph, The Assyrian Affair: A HistoricalPerspective, 6 INT'L J. MIDDLE

EAST STUD. 115, 115-16 (1975); contra Khaldun S. Husry, The Assyrian Affair of 1933 (1), 5
INT'L J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 161, 161-76 (1974); Khaldun S. Husry, The Assyrian Affair of
1933 (II), 5 INT'L J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 344 (1974).

JOHN JOSEPH, THE NESTORIANS AND THEIR MUSLIM NEIGHBORS 203 (1961); see
44.
also R.S. Stafford, Iraq and the Problem of the Assyrians, INT'L AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 1934, at

159, 178 (discussing the Semele massacre and the Assyrian predicament in Iraq generally).
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pierced on to the points of bayonets. Those who survived in
the other villages were now exposed day and night to constant raids and acts of violence Forced conversion to Islam
....Refusal was met with death.45
B.

SUFFERING UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN

The genocidal human rights violations of the Saddam Hussein regime
are well documented. 46 Even now, ghastly discoveries of mass gravesmany filled with women and children-have been continually made
throughout Iraq.47 Most of the violations occurred as part of the multistage
al-Anfal (meaning "the spoils")-an ethnic-cleansing campaign of the Iraqi
government, which included the targeting of Assyrians. In addition to violations against the Kurds, Marsh Arabs, and Turkomen, violations against
Assyrian human rights have been documented as well. 48 According to the
report of the Special Rappoteur, violations against the Assyrians included
the razing of villages, murder of civilians, and destruction of churches.4 9
"What happened to [the Assyrians and Yezidis] remains one of the great

45.
TRAGEDY, supra note 30, at 53. At this time there also was an overlap with the
issue of Jewish self-determination.
David Ben Gurion also related several times during the 1930s to the lessons of the Armenians and the massacre of the Assyrians, viewing their
fate as a compelling and significant example of broken promises. Ben
Gurion touched upon the massacre of the Assyrians, despite its limited
scope (in August 1933, hundreds were murdered) ....He wrote in his
journal, [in 1936], that he had prepared questions for friends in the British Parliament, in the event of an attack against us by the Arab lobby.
One of the questions was, "What does the massacre of the Assyrians in
Iraq teach us?"
AURON, supra note 33, at 25 (quoting 3 DAVID BEN GURION, MEMOIRS 275-76 (1976) (Hebrew)).
46.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IRAQ'S CRIME OF GENOCIDE: THE ANFAL CAMPAIGN
AGAINST THE KURDS (1995).
See, e.g., John F. Bums, In New Hussein Trial, a Grisly Portraitof Mass Kill47.
ings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2006, at A15 (stating that two hundred mass graves have been
found in Iraq since 2003).
48.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Human Rights, Special
Rappoteur of the Comm. of Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq,
1 109-13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/31 (Feb. 18, 1992) (preparedby Max van der Stoel). But
see U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Human Rights, Rights of Persons
Belonging to National, or Ethic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 11 5-7, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1995/134 (Feb. 7, 1995) (dismissing various Assyrian allegations of human rights
violations).
49.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Human Rights, Special
Rappoteur of the Comm. of Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq,
In 109-13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/31 (Feb. 18, 1992) (preparedby Max van der Stoel).
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unexplained mysteries of Anfal: a brutal sideshow, as it were, to the Kurdish genocide. 5 °
A substantial part of the genocidal campaign of al-Anfal was an effort
to obliterate any non-Arab ethnicity through a process known as "Arabization.,, 51 Both historically and now, as a distinct ethnicity, Assyrians have
been subject to the threat to assimilate with the prevailing cultures around
them. There has been a consistent threat to relinquish the distinct culture
and become "Arabized.,, 52 During al-Anfal, in particular, Kurds and Arabs
were distinguished and polarized, each forced to select an ethnicity. Because Assyrians considered themselves neither Arab nor Kurd, they became
the increased focus of targeting. Ironically, however, Assyrians often bewith the Kurds, a classification known alternatively as
came categorized
53
"Kurdification."
III.
A.

LEGAL STANDARDS

POLITICAL HISTORY

Self-determination stands for the basic idea that, as a matter of right,
groups of peoples are entitled to uninhibited choices regarding their own
political, cultural, and social future.54 The primary history of the principle
begins with the structure of law and order that was used to reconfigure the
geopolitical landscape of the fallen Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires.55 In the wake of World War II, the principle was codified as a right
and exemplified as a fundamental principle of international law.5 6 By the
middle of the twentieth century, self-determination evolved as a tool that
was used to dismantle colonialism and restore power to the groups who
traditionally occupied those territories. 57 In the present era, selfdetermination has proven to be an increasingly relevant tool for solving
problems which face smaller ethnic, minority, and indigenous peoples
groups.58 The self-determination of peoples has thus become a vital, relevant, and evolving area of international law.
50.
51.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 46, at 209.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CLAIMS IN CONFLICT: REVERSING ETHNIC CLEANSING IN

NORTHERN IRAQ (2004), availableat http://hrw.org/reports/2004/iraqO804/iraqO804.pdf.
See DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 16, at 1859; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CLAIMS IN
52.
CONFLICT: REVERSING ETHNIC CLEANSING INNORTHERN IRAQ 15, 42-43 (2004).
53.
See, e.g., Overcrowding and Kurdification Threaten Christians in Northern

Iraq, AsIANEWS.rr, Oct. 15, 2007, http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=10562.
54.
See infra Part III.C. 1-2.
55.
See MUSGRAVE, supra note 38, at 25-26.
U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.
56.
In re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 37 I.L.M. 1340, 1372-74 (Can.).
57.
See discussion infra Part III.D.
58.
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The broader history of self-determination connects with ideas underlying the French Revolution. 59 There, it stood as an ideological shift from a
mentality of political subjugation to a posture of freedom and autonomy
with respect to how people related to their governments. 6° A similar example of the effects of this mentality appeared in the thinking of the American
Revolution's6 architects when they justified their own secession from British
sovereignty. 1
Much of the credit, however, for solidifying the principle of selfdetermination as it is understood today has been attributed to Woodrow
Wilson.62 For instance, in his renowned Fourteen Points speech, Wilson set
out many of the basic parameters of the principle, including national sover63
eignty and the uninhibited opportunity of national development and rule.
Regarding the emerging questions of self-determination in the regions geographically related to Assyrian habitation, Wilson stated that "[t]he Turkish
portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should
be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development." 64 Alongside Wilson, further recognition of the principle was given by Vladimir Lenin, who defined that the
"self-determination of nations means the political separation.., from alien
national bodies, [and] the formation of an independent national state. 65
At the end of World War I, like Assyrians, most minorities and nationalities did not have their demands for self-determination met. Instead,
power was reorganized in ways that served the interests of the more dominant states, while the rights of minorities and smaller nationalities were
subordinated to treaties.66 "The whole trend of the policy of the AustroHungarian Succession States has been towards centralization, and the denationalization of racial minorities, a policy in violent conflict with the
59.

See

ANTONIO

CASSESE,

SELF-DETERMINATION

OF

PEOPLES:

REAPPRAISAL I 1-13 (1995).
60.
Dov RONEN, THE QUEST FOR SELF-DETERMINATION 7-8 (1979).

61.

According to the Declaration of Independence,

whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive

. . .

A

LEGAL

it is the

Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers
in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and
Happiness.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
62.
CASSESE, supra note 59, at 19-33.
63.
President Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points Speech Before the Joint Session
(Jan. 8, 1918).
Id.
64.
65.

66.

VLADIMIR LENIN, THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION 11 (1951).

CASSESE, supra note 59, at 321-22.
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pledges of various degrees of local autonomy given to those Minorities
either under the Treaties, or outside [them]."67
B.

SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

After World War II, self-determination became authoritatively recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. 6 8 Article 1(2) states that the purpose of the United Nations is "[t]o develop friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples., 69 This inclusion was important because it signified the shift from
self-determination 70being merely a political concept to an internationally
defined legal right.
Many major international treaties and declarations that followed solidified the notion of self-determination in international law. For instance,
the right to self-determination appeared prominently in the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (ICCPR). 71 The ICCPR affirms that "[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social, and cultural development.972 Additionally, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights exhibited identical introductory language to the ICCPR on self-determination.7 3
Additionally, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples emphasized the right of self-determination in
the context of eliminating colonialism. 74 Its language on self-determination
rights mirrors the ICCPR.75 This document is also important because, more
broadly, it highlights the international debate that centered around two main
positions regarding the scope of self-determination's application to peo-

text.

67.

GEORGE, supra note 41, at 1393, compare with supra note 39 and accompanying

U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.
Id.
70.
MUSGRAVE, supra note 38, at 62.
71.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR].
72.
Id.
73.
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), at 14, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6313 (Dec. 16,
1966).
74.
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., 947th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec.
14, 1960).
75.
Id.
68.
69.
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ples. 76 One position argued that the right of self-determination belonged
strictly to the liberation of peoples in the context of decolonization.7 7 Thus,
only peoples under colonialist regimes had the right to announce their selfgovernance and break away from the rule of the prevailing sovereignty.
Others argued that the right of self-determination was not strictly limited to
the context of decolonization. 78 Rather, because the language of the instruments stated "all peoples" were entitled to self-determination, the right
could not be limited to colonized peoples alone.79
The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance With the
Charter of the United Nations ("The Friendly Declaration") signified the
authoritative acceptance of the latter position. 80 It stated more expansively
that
[b]y virtue of the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the
United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status
and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in
accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

[The] subjection of peoples to alien subjugation,
domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the
principle. 8'
Again, such express and nonlimiting language, along with additional
reference to peoples under "alien subjugation, domination[,] and exploita-

76.

See In re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 37 I.L.M. 1340, 1372-73

(Can.); Gregory Fox, Self-Determinationin the Post Cold War Era:A New InternalFocus?,

16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 733, 739 (1995).
77. In re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 37 I.L.M. 1340, 1372-73 (Can.).
78. Id.
79.
Yoram Dinstein, Self-Determination and the Middle East Conflict, in SELFDETERMINATION: NATIONAL REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONs 243, 248 (Yonah Alexander & Robert A. Friedlander eds., 1980).
80.
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625(XXV), at 123, U.S. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/25/2625 (Oct.
24, 1970).
81. Id.at 123-24.
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tion," strongly 82suggested that self-determination was not limited to decolonization alone.
C.

DEFINING THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES

1.

Peoples

The existence, proclamation, and scope of the right of selfdetermination can be readily traced, but it is somewhat more difficult to
define its component terms with authoritative precision.83 A functional
definition must at least address who constitutes "a people" and to what type
of determination they are entitled. Some have argued that, based on U.N.
Charter 1(2), "people" means "states. 84 Such an argument, however, was
rejected by the charter drafting committee who asserted that people and
states were distinct concepts.8 5 Additionally, the concept of people has been
equated with the collective population of a state. 86 A weakness of that definition, however, was that it failed to account for distinct subgroups who
could contribute to differences in the direction of the state as a whole. 87 At a
minimum, a people need not be that of the state as a whole.88
Consequently,
89
a people can constitute a minority population within a state.
Conceptually, international legal scholars differentiate the objective
versus subjective components of a people. 90 Antonio Cassese, for instance,
offers a two-part definition of a people. 91 First, it must be a national group
who is a member of a state composed of different national groups of com82.
CASSESE, supra note 59, at 90.
83.
In re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 37 I.L.M. 1340, 1370 (Can.)
("[W]ith little formal elaboration of the definition of 'peoples', the result has been that the
precise meaning of the term 'people' remains somewhat uncertain."); see also MUSGRAVE,
supra note 38, at 148 ("[People] has never been defined in any comprehensive or satisfactory manner.").
84.
MUSGRAVE, supra note 38, at 148-49.
85.
86.
87.

MUSGRAVE, supra note 38, at 148-49.
MUSGRAVE, supra note 38, at 151-53.
MUSGRAVE, supra note 38, at 153.

89.

Ian Brownlie, Rights of Peoples in Modern InternationalLaw, in THE RIGHTS OF

88.

In re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 37 I.L.M. 1340, 1370 (Can.).

PEOPLES 5 (James Crawford ed., 1988) (recognizing that the core definition of people is "the
right of a community which has a distinct character to have this character reflected in the
institutions of government under which it lives").

90.
MORTON H. HALPERIN, DAVID J. SCHEFFER & PATRICIA L. SMALL, SELFDETERMINATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 47 (1992); see generally Margaret Moore, The
Territorial Dimension of Self-Determination, in NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND
SECESSION 134 (1998).
91.
Antonio Cassese, The Self-Determination of Peoples, in THE INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 92, 95 (Louis Henkin ed.,
1981).
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parable dimensions. 92 Second, that national or ethnic group must be recognized as having a distinct legal status within the constitutional framework.93
Lee Buchheit augments this definition by looking at the "self' component
of self-determination, which is similarly divided by its objective and subjective dimensions. 94 A group is a people when it "perceives itself as being
reasonably distinct from its neighbors." 95 Yet, because any group can potentially claim its existence as a people on some subjective basis, a further
objective component is necessary. 96 At the most basic level, such foundational objective distinctions are present when there is some religious, historic, geographic, ethnologic, economic, linguistic, or racial distinction between the group in question and its surrounding population. 97
2.

Determination

To define determination, one may logically begin with the texts of the
resolutions themselves. The ICCPR states, by virtue of self-determination,
peoples "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development." 98 This language suggests that, at
its most basic level, self-determination constitutes the right to a people's
uninhibited political, cultural, and social development.99

92.
Id. In addition, increasing recognition has been given to groups that may have
smaller dimensions within their respective societies. Unlike Cassese's definition, which
emphasizes minority groups of comparable dimensions, some smaller ethnic groups may
nevertheless be seen as peoples possessing the right to self-determination. See Geoff Gilbert,
Autonomy and Minority Groups: A Right in InternationalLaw?, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 307,
308 (2002) ("[A] particular group might form a minority within the state and, at the same
time, qualify as a people.").
93.
See Cassese, supra note 91. Cassese's discussion suggests a limitation on federally recognized constitutional entities, which excludes ethnic minorities. Cassese, supra note
91, at 101. But others have affirmed that not only are some minorities peoples, but many
argue minorities themselves are entitled to self-determination. See MUSGRAVE, supra note
38, at 167-77. It is not, therefore, an unreasonable extension of Cassese's principle to state
that minorities recognized in a constitutional framework may be sufficient to satisfy the
objective component of people and are therefore entitled to self-determination. See
MUSGRAVE, supra note 38, at 167-77.
94.

LEE C. BucHHErr, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 10

(1978).
95.
Id.
96.
Id.
97.
In re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 37 I.L.M. 1340, 1371 (Can.); see
also Lung-Chu Chen, Self-Determination and World Public Order,66 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1290 (1991), compare with discussion infra Part IV.C.
98.
ICCPR, supra note 71.
99. See ICCPR, supra note 71.

20081

THE URGENT REAWAKENING OF THE ASSYRIAN QUESTION

Another important definitional distinction occurs between the internal
and external dimensions of self-determination.l °° This distinction originates
in prior debates over the limitation of the concept to decolonization.10 1 This
is because external self-determination requires a people to govern themselves absent outside external interference.10 2 It means, essentially, secession-the process by which a people replaces an existing state or emerges
to form its own. 10 3 By contrast, internal self-determination deals with the
selection of government and the political, economic, social, and cultural
aspects by which a people freely participate and exercise their rights within
a sovereign territory. 10 4
External self-determination is seen as a measure of last resort and becomes plausible only when practically all internal remedies of selfdetermination have been blocked or exhausted. 10 5 It is viewed as radical
because breaking away from an existing state tramples on traditional notions of state sovereignty, mainly, that state's right to govern itself without
interference.10 6 Thus, based on external self-determination's radical nature,
discussions have shifted to identifying and implementing the principle's
internal modes. 10 7 Hence, when qualified peoples and minorities living
within states have legitimate claims of self-determination, the effectuation
of their right, if recognized at all, must be accomplished in degrees short of
secession. 108
In this context, autonomy- and quasi-autonomy-based solutions have
appeared increasingly appropriate. 10 9 Autonomy-based solutions attempt to
100.
Gregory Fox, Self-Determination in the Post Cold War Era: A New Internal
Focus?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 733, 734 (1995).
101.
Id. at 733-34.
102.
103.

BUCHHEIT, supra note 94, at 13-14.
BUCHHEIT, supra note 94, at 15.

104.
In re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 37 I.L.M. 1340, 1340, 1371 (Can.)
(recognizing that internal self-determination is a "people's pursuit of its political, economic,
social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state.").
105.
In re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 37 I.L.M. 1340, 1372-73 (Can.)
(citing massive human rights violations and a lack of participation within political processes).
106.
In re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 37 I.L.M. 1340, 1373 (Can.).
107.
Id. ("There is no necessary incompatibility between the maintenance of the
territorial integrity of existing states... and the right of a 'people' to achieve a full measure
of self-determination.").
108.
In re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 37 I.L.M. 1340, 1371 (Can.).
109.
HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOvEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 333-69
(2d ed. 1992) (discussing the viability of federal or quasi-federal autonomy structures and

providing examples); RUTH LAPIDOTH, AUTONOMY: FLEXIBLE SOLUTIONS TO ETHNIC

CONFLICTS 23 (1997) ("One way to satisfy these demands [of self-determination] while
preserving the existence of the state and its territorial integrity is by establishing regimes of
autonomy."); Brownlie, supra note 89, at 1, 6 (stating that contrasted with secession, selfgovernment and autonomy are plausible implementations of self-determination); Gregory
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provide people with a greater degree of self-management and control in
order to effectuate their right of self-determination. Such solutions are designed to be flexible and may be implemented in a variety of forms within
states so long as they operate within the existing framework." ° Particularly,
in federalized states, peoples may be granted some degree of territorial control."' Most importantly, however, such solutions need not reflect a particular form or arrangement,
but rather, "evidence creative legal and constitu'' 12
tional thought."
Autonomy-based solutions are looked at favorably because they can
enable the simultaneous preservation of a state's territorial integrity with
1 3
self-determination claims of peoples living within those sovereign states.
Furthermore, deep ethnic, religious, and linguistic distinctions that drive
claims of self-determination can find a satisfactory degree of fulfillment
where a people begin to exercise their own control over their status, which
includes their distinguishing factors." a Thus, autonomy can fulfill selfdetermination claims by giving a people a greater degree of political, social,
and economic control over their own destiny and still stop short of secession, thereby preserving both state sovereignty and a people's legitimate
claims.115
D.

AN EXPANDING INDIGENOUS APPLICATION

Rapidly solidifying international principles regarding indigenous peoples bring added precision to the discussion of self-determination of peoples

Fox, Self-Determination in the Post Cold War Era: A New Internal Focus?, 16 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 733, 734 (1995) (viewing internal self-determination to "include minority protection
regimes, democratic political processes, safeguards for cultural rights, and various forms of
federative autonomy"); Geoff Gilbert, Autonomy and Minority Groups: A Right in International Law?, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 307, 309 (2002) ("[S]elf-determination is increasingly
recognized as having an internal aspect that requires full and effective participation by all
groups in society[,] . . . [and] autonomy [is] a method of affording internal selfdetermination to minorities."); Otto Kimminich, A "Federal" Right of Self-Determination?,
in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 83, 98 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993); Steven
Wheatley, Deliberative Democracy and Minorities, 14 EuR. J. INT'L L. 507, 509 (2003)
(stating marginalized minority rights can be effectuated in adaptable autonomy regimes).
110.

RUTH LAPIDOTH, AUTONOMY: FLEXIBLE SOLUTIONS TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS 49

(1997). Ruth Lapidoth traces five categories of autonomy: "federal systems, decentralization, self-government, associate statehood, and self-administration." Id.
111.
Id.
112.
HANNUM, supra note 109, at 333.
113.
LAPIDOTH, supra note 110, at 23.
114.
LAPiDOTH, supra note 110.
115.
Gilbert, supra note 109, at 308-09.
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in regard to the Assyrian Question."6 This contributes to the discussion
because a series of indigenous peoples declarations link indigenous peoples' rights to the right of self-determination.' 1 7 Importantly, not only is
there the link to self-determination, but there is an added right to autonomous administration. 1 8 The recently adopted United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, for instance, provides a key illustration. 19 It states that, "[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to selfdetermination."'120 It follows in article 4 with an expansive assertion that,

"inexercising their right to self-determination, [indigenous peoples] have
the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal
and local affairs,
as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous
' 121
functions."

"Indigenous" is not defined within the convention itself, but important
commentary sheds light on its definition. A key source is the study of the
Special Rapporteur, Jos6 Martinez Cobo, in the report entitled "Study of the
122
Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations."' Jos6 Marti-

nez Cobo defines indigenous communities as those

peoples and nations ...which, having a historical continu-

ity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from
other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories or parts of them .... [They] are determined to pre-

serve, develop, and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity,
as the basis of
23
their continued existence as peoples.
116.
Brownlie, supra note 89, at 1, 16 (referring to the fundamental interdependency
of the areas of self-determination, minority rights, and the status issues of indigenous peoples).
117.
See, e.g., Int'l Labour Org. [ILO], Convention Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, ILO Conv. No. 169, 72 ILO Official Bull. 59
(June 27, 1989) [hereinafter ILO Convention].
118.
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res.
61/295, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/61/L.67 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Indigenous Declaration].
119.
Id.
120.
Id. art. 3.
121.
Id. art. 4.
122.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, SubComm'n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Study of the Problem of
Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations,
375-82,
U.N.
Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4 (July 30, 1981) (preparedby Josd Martinez Cobo) [hereinafter
Indigenous Report].
123.
Id. 379; see also Sarah Pritchard, Working Group on IndigenousPopulations:
Mandated, Standard-Setting Activities and Future Perspectives, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES,
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The report goes on to elaborate on what constitutes historical continuity,
including the occupation of lands, common ancestry with occupants, cultural transmission, a mother tongue, and regional habitation. 24 Furthermore, members of indigenous groups express belonging through self25
and the group itself retains the ability to define who beidentification,'
26
it.'
longs to
E.

IRAQI LAW

1.

Assyrians in IraqiLaw

A new period of reconstruction began in Iraq as the United States entered Baghdad and the regime of Saddam Hussein fell. 127 The transition of
power and remaking of Iraqi law began with several meetings between opposition groups where the structure of the new constitutional government
began to emerge. The opposition conference held in London, for instance,
"debated the injustice and national oppression exercised against the Assyrians and stresse[d] the importance of guaranteeing their equality with others
and agree[d] to grant them their ethnic, cultural and administrative rights
within128a defined legal framework, and to protect these rights constitutionally."'

Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) followed, which solidified
many of the provisions of the emerging democracy.' 29 The scope of TAL
dealt with day-to-day security issues, broader issues regarding the rights
given to the people, and the nature and structure of the government.' 3" Assyrians received explicit reference in several provisions.' 31 Article 30, for
instance, guaranteed fair representation in electing a National Assembly to

THE UNrrED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 40, 43 (Sarah Pritchard ed., 1998) (stating that

attempts to limit the definition of indigenous to colonized people have been unsuccessful).
124.
Indigenous Report, supra note 122, 1 380.
125.
Indigenous Report, supra note 122, 381.
126.
Id. 382; see also ILO Convention, supra note 117, art. 1(2) (stating that selfidentification is a fundamental criterion of determining who is indigenous), compare with
HALPERIN, SCHEFFER & SMALL, supra note 90, at 47 (raising the objective and subjective
components in defining peoples).
127.
See generally Danny Hakim, A Nation at War: Iraqis in the U.S. Celebrate
Hussein's Seeming Downfall, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2003, at B 13.
128.
Political Statement of the Iraqi Opposition Conference in London (Dec. 14-16,
2002), in KURDISTAN OBSERVER, Dec. 19, 2002, http://home.cogeco.ca/-konews/20-12-02-

political-statement-london-conference.html [hereinafter Iraq Opposition Conference].
129.
Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (2004)
[hereinafter TAL], available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/govemment/TAL.html.
130. Id. art. 7(A).
131.
Id. arts. 30(C), 53(D).

20081

THE URGENT REA WAKENING OF THE ASSYRIAN QUESTION

Assyrians and other minorities. 13 2 Article 53 assured that the "administra133
tive, cultural, and political rights" of the Assyrians would be preserved.
Similarly, article
9 discussed the preservation of Syriac 134 and the right to
135
educate in it.

The Iraqi Constitution followed TAL, heralding the transition from
persecution and repression to a "republican, federal, democratic, [and] pluralistic" government. 136 It self-consciously attempts to preserve equal
treatment of all of Iraq's citizens and to promote the rule of law. 137 In regard to Assyrians, similarly to TAL, the right to speak and educate in
Syriac is preserved. 138 Furthermore, article 4 also extends protection to the
Assyrian language stating: "The Turkomen language and Syriac language
are the two other official languages in the administrative units in which they
constitute density of population." 139 The preeminent provision of importance for Assyrians currently is article 125.140 Recognizing other powers as
belonging to local administrations, this article states the "[c]onstitution shall
guarantee the administrative, political, cultural and educational rights of the
various nationalities, such as Turkomen, Chaldeans, Assyrians and all other
constituents, and this shall be regulated by law. 141
2.

InternationalIncorporationand IraqiLaw

The extent of control that international law should explicitly have
within the domestic body of Iraqi law remains an open question. 142 Its role
132.
133.

134.

Id. art. 30(C).
Id. art. 53(D).

LANGUAGES, supra note 8.

135.
TAL, supra note 129, art. 9.
136.
IRAQ [Constitution] pmbl.; see generally Ashley S. Deeks & Matthew D. Burton, Iraq's Constitution: A Drafting History,40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (2007); Noah Feldman
& Roman Martinez, Constitutional Politics and Text in the New Iraq: An Experiment in
Islamic Democracy, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 883 (2006); Stephen Townley, Mosque and State
in Iraq'sNew Constitution,34 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y (2006).
137.
IRAQ [Constitution] pmbl.
138.
Id. art. 4.
139.
Id.
140.
Id. art. 125; see infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing article 125 in depth).
141.
IRAQ [Constitution] art. 125.
142.
Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REv. 857, 870-72
(2004-2005). The United States, for instance, recognizes international law incorporated into
our federal common law. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International
law is part of our law."). But in particular circumstances, international law may be trumped
by a federal statute. Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 939
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that a federal statute cannot be challenged on the ground that it
violates international law); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES § 111(1) (1987) (discussing the application of international law in the
United States).
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43
has been openly recognized from the outset of the transition of power. 1
The law of the transitional period carried an open recognition of international law's binding effect on Iraq as well. 144 Article 23 stated that the
rights of the Iraqi people were not limited to TAL, but were to include "the
rights stipulated in international treaties and agreements, other instruments
of international law that Iraq has signed and to which it has acceded, and
others that are deemed binding upon it, and in the law of nations." 145
Similar provisions were contained in draft versions of the constitution. 146 The original article 44 read: "All individuals have the right to enjoy
the rights stated in international treaties and agreements concerned with
human rights that Iraq has ratified and that do not contradict with the principles of this constitution."'' 47 In drafting the permanent constitution, however, this article was eliminated. 48 The rationale was purportedly that, with
the inclusion of the article, human rights treaties became subordinated to
the constitution, hence, removing the article results in a stronger independent basis for asserting the rights contained in those treaties. 149 Alternatively,
these constrictions of international obligations indicated a reticence among
Shi'a clerics to commit to principles that could potentially result in contradictions with tenets of Islam.
Despite the fact that no such explicit statement presently binds Iraq to
preexistent treaty obligations relevant to the law of self-determination, such
an obligation may still be discerned. At least two alternative bases exist to
demonstrate the incorporation of international law into Iraqi law. First, article 8 of the constitution provides an alternative reference from which Iraq's
international obligations may be inferred. 150 The article affirms that Iraq
will "respect its international obligations."' 51 Additionally, that article recognizes that Iraq will respect the principle of non-interference with the af-

143.
Iraqi Opposition Conference, supra note 128, point 6.
144.
TAL, supra note 129, art. 23.
TAL, supra note 129, art. 23.
145.
146.
IRAQ [Constitution] art. 44 (draft of Aug. 24, 2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/24-08-05-constit.pdf.
147.
Id.
148.

OF THE

available at

NATHAN J. BROWN, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, THE FINAL DRAFT
IRAQI CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY (2005), available at

http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/FinalDraftSept I6.pdf.
149.
Id.
150.
IRAQ [Constitution] art. 8.
151.
Id.; see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human
Rights, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, The Right to
Self-Determination: Implementation of United Nations Resolutions,
75, U.N. Doc.
EICN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev. 1 (1980) (preparedby Hdctor Gros Espiell) (explaining that the Iraqi
representative to the United Nations declared that the principle of self-determination as
espoused in the Friendly Declaration constituted a true principle of jus cogens).
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fairs of other states and the peaceful settlement of disputes. 52 Because
those are arguably references to the purposes of the United Nations, and
because the promotion of self-determination is a fundamental purpose of
the United Nations, Iraq implicitly binds itself, by constitution, to recognize
the principle of self-determination. Furthermore, Iraq has still affirmed the
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.1 53 Consequently, international human rights, self-determination, and indigenous peoples
conven54
tions are binding on Iraq and must be applied to their full effect.1
IV.

THE ASSYRIANS: AN ARGUMENT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION

The Assyrian realization of the right of self-determination must begin
within the existing Iraqi constitutional framework-any workable Assyrian
claim of self-determination is not an argument for secession. 55 At the same
time, arguments for the right of self-determination must anticipate its denial
by that system, as well as the possible fragmentation of the Iraqi system
itself. 56 This is the case because such a right has been frustrated, both presently and historically.157 Furthermore, because Iraq's ability to survive as a
single state has been brought into question, approaches to preserving a viable legal status for Assyrians must be linked with a preexistent body of
international rights that will remain intact even if the constitutional structure fails to effectuate any legitimate claims or the system itself fails. It is
virtually unquestionable that Assyrians have had, and will continue to have,
an important place in Iraqi history.
A.

ASSYRIANS ARE A DISTINCT PEOPLE

Foremost, it must be recognized that Assyrians are a distinct people
under international law and are therefore entitled to the meaningful exercise
of internal self-determination in its fullest political, economic, and social
dimensions. 158 Assyrians meet the criterion of a people both objectively and
subjectively.15 9 In the objective sense, Assyrians are distinguishable from
the society that surrounds them. The ancient language of Syriac rather than
152.

153.

IRAQ

[Constitution] art. 8.

Indigenous Declaration, supra note 118.

154.
See Indigenous Declaration, supra note 118.
See sources cited supra note 109.
155.
156.
Robert D. Sloane, The Policies of State Secession: Harmonizing SelfDeterminationand Global Orderin the Twenty-First Century, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1288,
1308-09 (2007) (discussing the plausibility of a multi-state in a post-Hussein Iraq based on
external self-determination).
157.
See discussion supra Parts I.B, II.
158.
See discussion supra Part III.C-D.
159.
See discussion supra Parts L.A, lI.C.1.
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Arabic is spoken.' 6° Christianity is practiced rather than predominant Islamic religion.' 61 Moreover, their ethnic division is neither Arab nor
Kurd.' 62 Recent scientific evidence in fact confirms such an objective distinction.163 Genetic samples taken from a wide cross section of the Assyrian
population in the Middle East demonstrated that those samples were clearly
different from the surrounding national populations. 64 Thus, differences in
language, religious practice, and ethnicity affirm that the Assyrians are objectively distinct from the culture and people that surround them.
The Iraqi Constitution itself affirms this objective distinction. 65 In
particular, the Assyrian language has been both recognized and preserved
as a vehicle to maintain educational and cultural rights. 166 In fact, the preservation of educational, linguistic, and political rights shadows the language
of the ICCPR, which itself identifies the importance of those discrete categories as rights of peoples. It follows then that the Iraqi Constitution implicitly and explicitly recognizes Assyrians as a distinct people.167 At the very
a constitutional
least, Assyrians are a minority population recognized within
68
structure, as required under Casseses's adapted definition.'
Assyrians are also an indigenous people.169 Aside from the previously
mentioned categories of ethnicity, language, and religion, perhaps the single
most critical factor that bolsters Assyrian's indigenous status is their historical relationship with Iraq. Credible historical evidence and narrative
attestation suggests that the Assyrians have had a continuous, longstanding,
and ancient relationship with the land. 70 They are among its most primitive
inhabitants. This continuity may be observed through church rites and liturgy which trace back thousands of years to the predominance of classical
Aramaic-the ancient lingua franca.17 1 Similarly, the Syriac language provides the linkage to the ancient Aramaic language, as well as one of the
most primitive languages in existence.1 72 Considered together, these factors
160. See discussion supra Part I.A.
161.
See discussion supra Part I.A.
See discussion supra Parts I.A, II.B.
162.
163.
Joel J. Elias, The Genetics of Modern Assyrians and Their Relationship to Other
People of the Middle East, NINEVEH MAG., First/Second Quarter 2000,
http://www.assyrianfoundation.org/genetics.htm ("[Tihe data provide [sic] unequivocal
evidence that Assyrians as a people are distinguishable from all other population groups in
their genetic characteristics and are not a part of any other population.").
Id.
164.
165.
See discussion supra Part III.E. 1.
IRAQ [Constitution] art. 4.
166.
See ICCPR, supra note 71, art. 1.
167.
See Cassese, supra note 91, at 95.
168.
See ICCPR, supra note 71; TAL, supra note 129, art. 3.
169.
170.
See discussion supra Parts I.A, IM.D.
171.
See discussion supra Part I.A.
172.

See LANGUAGES, supra note 8.
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strongly suggest the ancient historical continuity between the Assyrians and
73
Iraq, and, therefore, demonstrate that Assyrians are an indigenous people.
At the very least, they have preceded colonialism in the Middle East and the
modem nation-state, which is a requirement
under the operational definition
174
of what it means to be indigenous.
Lastly, Assyrians subjectively consider themselves distinct from other
ethnic groups.1 75 This is evidenced by the fact that the term Assyrian, for
instance, remains a common self-reference that is used to refer to an Aramaic-speaking Christian. 7 6 In a statement to the United Nations, an
Aramean 177 organization openly distinguished itself from other ethnicities,
stating that self-determination becomes suppressed when such groups are
wrongfully identified as Arab or Kurdish Christians. 78 In addition to considering themselves ethnically distinct, Assyrians also consider themselves
indigenous.179 This is relevant because self-identification as indigenous is
an important factor of being indigenous.1 80 A brief survey, thus, reveals that
Assyrians fulfill the subjective component for the definition of an indigenous people. 181
B.

HOW AN AUTONOMY-BASED SOLUTION PROVIDES A PLAUSIBLE GRANT
OF DETERMINATION

Presently, several proposals in the Assyrian community employ notions of autonomy. While these proposals differ in regard to territorial and
organizational aspects, they can be viewed as conceptually invoking autonomy in various degrees. 182 For instance, the proposal for an Autonomous
Assyrian Region would attempt to reinstitute a form of the Ottoman Millet
173.
See discussion supra Part III.D.
174.
See supra note 123 and accompanying text (stressing historical continuity with
pre-colonial societies).
175.
See BUCHHEIT, supra note 94, at 9.
176.
See Parpola, supra note 2, at 18.
177.
See discussion supra note 4.
178.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, The Right
of Peoples to Self-Determination and its Application to Peoples Under Colonial or Alien
Domination or Foreign Occupation: Racism, Racial Discrimination,Xenophobia, and All
Forms of Discrimination,U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/NGO/1 18 (Mar. 12, 2003) (submitted by
Syriac Universal Alliance).
179.
E.g., Suzy David, Assyrian Universal Alliance, Statement to the SubCommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Working Group
on
Indigenous
Populations
(Jul.
24-28,
2000),
available
at
http://www.aua.net/intemational/un/eighteenthsessionjitem4.htm.
180.
See Indigenous Report, supra note 122.
181.
See discussion supra Part lII.C-D.
182.
See Michael Youash, What Does an Administrative Area Mean? Understanding
the 'Nineveh Plain Resolution', ASSYRIAN STAR, Spring 2007, at 11. Terminology in this
area is admittedly confusing. Id.
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system centered in Mosul and relocate Assyrians into the northern Nineveh
region.' Additionally, proponents for an Assyrian province have suggested that multiple governorates in which Assyrians have a substantial
presence be divided to create a new separate governorate.' 84 Perhaps the
most viable proposal at this stage is for an Assyrian administrative area,
also known as the Nineveh Plain Resolution, which provides that Assyrians
be grouped into an administrative area that intersects multiple governorates.
It would have a local governing authority that would supervise health care,
its own poeducation, cultural programs, various legal matters (including
85
lice force), tourism, and archeology within that area.'
Resolving the correctness of each of these positions is not necessary to
argue that some form of an autonomy-based arrangement could provide the
Assyrian people a key political and social place in the fledgling Iraqi democracy through enhanced territorial self-governance. These positions
show, at least, that outstanding claims exist. The key is, however, because
autonomy solutions are flexible implementations of self-determination
rights, they should be viewed as highly appropriate for Assyrian people
who have a viable self-determination claim' 86 In this particular case,
autonomy solutions are additionally appropriate because they can be
grounded both
internally in the Iraqi Constitution and externally in interna87
tional law.'
1.

Article 125

Basic textual interpretation supports the application of article 125 to
enable Assyrian people to effectuate some form of politically-based autonomy within the Iraqi federalism. 88 As noted previously, that key article
guarantees "administrative, political, cultural, and educational rights for the
various nationalities, such as... Chaldeans [and] Assyrians."' 89 The probIvan Kakovitch, In Pursuit of an Assyrian Autonomous Region, ASSYRIAN STAR,
183.
Spring 2006, at 34.
See Youash, supra note 182, at 9 (explaining the enabling Iraqi constitutional
184.
provisions and citing proposed language of congressional resolution in the proposal's favor).
This proposal has been raised to the United Nations Working Group on the Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities as well. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC],
Comm'n on Human Rights on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, Working Group on
Minorities, Report of the Working Group on Minorities on its Eleventh Session, 8, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/27 (July 8, 2005).
185.
Youash, supra note 182, at 13.
186.
See HANNUM, supra note 109, at 333.
187.
E.g., IRAQ [Constitution] art. 125.
188.
Id. Not all proposals are equally constitutional however. See Youash, supra note
182, at 11.
IRAQ [Constitution] art. 125
189.
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lem, however, is that a plain reading of the article does not definitively establish what is meant by administrative rights. Some have suggested that
such vagueness was intentional because it was among a package of articles
that were fiercely debated. 90 In fact, the entire first stage of constitutional
development in Iraq was a protracted debate, not over the role of religion,
but rather over the shape of federalism in the newly reformed nation. 191
Applying established canons of statutory construction helps shed
meaningful light on the conclusion that administrative rights imply some
measure of autonomy for minority populations in Iraq such as the Assyrians. In determining the meaning of an ambiguous statute, interpreters may
justifiably look at the headings and titles of sections in order to ascertain the
intent of the legislature. 192 Because the article falls within the sections detailing the division of federal powers, arguably, administrative
rights were
193
units.
sub-federal
as
drafters
constitutional
the
by
intended
The tenor of these provisions justifies the greater vesting of localized
power to minority populations such as Assyrians. 94 The purpose of such a
grant of autonomy is to ensure minority survival and enrich the democratic
political system. 95 Often, in some cases, "only an autonomy regime could
assure the group and its culture's survival."' 196 Thus, these are deliberately
intended as the key constitutional recognitions that will197 provide the backbone for protection of ethnic minorities in Iraqi society.
Expressly protecting the rights of the Assyrians, Chaldeans, Turkomen, and Yezidis appeared to reflect an adherence to the existing human
rights conventions such as the ICCPR.198 According to commentators on the
Iraqi Constitution, article 125 "is concerned not with local governments but
protection for minorities."' 199 Thus, "[w]hat is being identified are exceptional federal units that are meant to secure protective measures that guar190.
Makau Mutua, The Iraq Paradox: Minority and Group Rights in a Viable Constitution, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 927, 946 (2006).
191.
John McGarry & Brendan O'Leary, Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal Consociation as PoliticalPrescription,5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 670, 688-89 (2007).
192.
IA NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 18.11 (6th
ed. 2000).

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Youash, supra note 182, at 4-5.
Mutua, supra note 190, at 945-46.
Mutua, supra note 190, at 948; see discussion infra Part IV.D.
Mutua, supra note 190, at 946; see discussion supra Part I.A-B
McGarry & O'Leary, supra note 191, at 688-89.

See PUB. INT'L LAW & POLICY GROUP & THE CENTURY FOUND., ESTABLISHING A

STABLE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE IN IRAQ: SOME BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

52-53

(2003),

available

at

http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/publications/reportsllraqReport.pdf.
199.
Yash Ghai & Jill Cottrell, A Review of the Constitution of Iraq 28,
http://www.law.wisc.edulgls/arotcoi.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2008).
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antee Iraq's minorities can make a constructive contribution to Iraq's stability and development through federal arrangements that are territorial. ' '2°
Furthermore, without some broader and tangible extension in the form
of territorial self-governance, article 125 is an empty promise. In other
words, some degree of localized control over social, cultural, and educational resources is necessary. Otherwise, there is no guarantee that such
constitutional grants will be met and consequently, article 125 will be of no
effect. A key example is the ineffectuality of Revolution Command Council
Decree No. 251 of 26 April 1973.2°1 It was a law created by the Ba'athist
regime that similarly guaranteed cultural rights to Syriac-speaking people in
Iraq. 2 02 At the same time, the human rights violations of that regime have
been well noted.2 °3 Thus, interpreting article 125 entails localized control
among the article's named groups because without some extended measure
of control, administrative rights will merely be an unsupported promise.20 4
In light of the latent ambiguity in article 125 and viable arguments that
the article entails some form of autonomous self-administration of resources in order to protect Iraqi minorities, Assyrians could now consider
petitioning the Iraqi Supreme Court for an authoritative advisory interpretation regarding the meaning of the article. It is clear that the Iraqi high court
has jurisdiction over this question based on its broad authority to interpret
provisions of the constitution. 0 5 Based on persistent harms, Assyrians have
standing, and because these issues are ongoing, the question is arguably
ripe. Despite the traditional prerequisites of justiciability, the possibility
remains that the court will decline to resolve a political question. 20 6 However, if the court were to consider the question, there would be a cogent
argument based on article 125. Additionally, as previously discussed, if
international law were deemed incorporated into Iraqi law, the external
body of international law could provide a constitutional issue for the court
to resolve expressly as a question of self-determination.

200.
Iraq Sustainable Democracy Project, Policy Briefing: Proposing the Operationalization of the Art. 125 Solution: Establishing the Nineveh Plain Administrative Unit 4
(2007), http://www.iraqdemocracyproject.org/pdf/NPAU-policybrief.pdf [hereinafter Democracy Project].
201.
See U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination [CERD], State
Party Report: Republic of Iraq, 32, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/240/Add.3 (Apr. 1,1996), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CERD.C.240.Add.3.En?OpenDocument
(highlighting portions of Revolution Command Council Decree No. 251 (Apr. 26, 1973)).
202.
Id.
203.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
204.
See IRAQ [Constitution] art. 125.
205.
Id. art. 93.
206.
Id.
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InternationalLaw

From the standpoint external to Iraq, it is arguable that administrative
rights should take the shape of an autonomy regime because autonomy solutions have a firm basis in contemporary international practice. °7 The
clearest international grant to peoples has been expressed in the recently
adopted Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 0 s Explicitly, it
states that the exercise of indigenous self-determination entails a "right to
autonomy or self-government in matters relating to ...

internal and local

affairs." 209 This is applicable because Assyrians are arguably an indigenous
people.2 10 For the sake of argument, even if they are not, autonomy solutions have been applied in broader contexts of peoples and minorities
movements. 211 For instance, varying degrees of autonomy have been
granted within states such as Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, and,
a prime and rele212
vant example, to the Kurdish population of Iraq itself.
C.

THE KURDISH PARALLEL

The Kurdish self-determination question has inspired a host of scholarly studies that touch on the existence of the right and various degrees regarding its implementation. 2 13 It has been consistently argued that the Kurds
are entitled to the exercise of self-determination. 1 4 Richard Falk, for in-

207.
See supranote 109.
208.
Indigenous Declaration, supra note 118.
209.
Indigenous Declaration, supranote 118, art. 4.
210.
See discussion supraPart IV.A.
211.
HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 337-69
(rev. ed. 1996).
212.
Id.
213.
See MORTON H. HALPERIN, DAVID J. SCHEFFER & PATRIcIA L. SMALL, SELF-

DETERMINATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 38-44 (1992) (discussing Kurdish selfdetermination as a post-Cold War case study); HURST HANNuM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY,
AND SELF-DETERMINATION 178-202 (rev. ed. 1996) (discussing Kurdish ethnic, social, and
political history); Gregory J. Ewald, The Kurds' Right to Secede Under InternationalLaw:
Self-Determination Prevails Over Political Manipulation, 22 DENV. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y

375, 402 (1994); Richard Falk, Problems and Prospectsfor the Kurdish Struggle for Self-

DeterminationAfter the End of the Gulf and Cold Wars, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 591, 602

(1994); see also Carole A. O'Leary & Karna A.J. Eklund, Symposium, Pluralism vs. Modem Iraqi Nationalism: Root Causes of State-Sponsored Violence Against Iraq's Kurdish
Community and the Searchfor Post-ConflictJustice, 13 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 91 (2005).
214.
Gregory J. Ewald, The Kurds' Right to Secede Under International Law: SelfDeterminationPrevails Over PoliticalManipulation,22 DENV. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 375,402
(1994) ("The Kurds are certainly entitled to the right of self-determination and would have
an extremely strong case for secession."); Richard Falk, Problems and Prospects for the
Kurdish Struggle for Self-Determination After the End of the Gulf and Cold Wars, 15 MICH.
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stance, reasons that "[g]iven Kurdish numbers, self-identification, and association with specific territory over a period of at least 2000 years, and given
the consistent Kurdish experience of abuse and discrimination within existing States in the region, a maximalist case for claiming rights of selfdetermination on behalf of the Kurdish people exists. 21 5 Gregory Ewald
likewise argues that the Kurds are entitled to self-determination because
they are a group distinguishable from the population based on language,
ethnicity, and physiognomy.21 6 Such a right also exists because Kurds possess substantial human rights grievances and historically-rooted deprivations of territory. 217
As noted, some take the existence of the right of self-determination for
the extended argument that secession claims are justified.2 18 Expectedly,
such Kurdish secession-based arguments have been countered by both practical and political considerations. 219 In contrast to idealizations about secession, the debate has focused on potential internal remedies that do not oppose Iraqi or Turkish sovereignty. 220 Thus, in the Kurdish case, the limitation of secessionist claims finds better support in more tempered expressions of rights as a people in degrees of autonomy as well.2 2'
The parallel Kurdish Question illuminates the potency of the Assyrian
Question because the reasons for which Kurds are seen as possessing the
right to self-determination equally apply to the Assyrians. Historically, the
Assyrian Question has been inextricably woven, and perhaps simultaneously subordinated, to parallel Kurdish claims.222 Yet, there are strong correlations between the geographical, historical, and ethnic identities of the
two peoples that permit the analogization of the two cases.223 The factors of
J. INT'L L. 591,602 (1994) ("On the basis of the status of the right of self-determination and
recent practice, the Kurdish legal position is strong ....
215.
Falk, supra note 214, at 603.
216.
Ewald, supra note 214, at 394-97.
217.
Ewald, supra note 214, at 394-97.
Ewald, supra note 214, at 402.
218.
219.
KERIM YILDIZ, THE KURDS IN IRAQ PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 194-95 (2007).
220.
Gilbert, supra note 109, at 347-48 (discussing the Kurdish case inside Turkey
and key international legal decisions).
221.
See discussion supra Part III.C.2.
222.
Natasha Carver, Is Iraq/Kurdistan a State That Can be Said to Operate State
Systems and Thereby Offer Protection to It's 'Citizens'?, 14 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 57, 69
(2002) (stating political rights of Assyrians and others have not been given effect by Kurdish
authorities); Siobhan Roth, Advocates PonderIraq After Hussein Opposition Groups Jockey
for Influence, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 25, 2002; see generally Frances Raday, SelfDetermination and Minority Rights, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 453 (2003) (comparing the
parallel rights of self-determination between the Israelis and Palestinians).
223.
YILDIZ, supra note 119, at 51 ("Kurds have not been the sole victims of the Iraqi
state. The Shi'ites and Marsh Arabs have also suffered, as have Turcomans, Chaldaneans
[sic] and Assyrians inhabiting the predominantly Kurdish three northern governorates.").
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physiognomy 22 4 ethnic and linguistic distinction, 225 history of persecu227
tion, 226 deprivation of historically-occupied territories, 22
human rights vio22
229
lations, 8 and continuous regional habitation
that make up the Kurdish
right of self-determination, based on similar salient factors, lead to the conclusion that Assyrians possess the right of self-determination as well, implemented as a degree of autonomy.230 If the Kurds are entitled to selfdetermination then, afortiori, so are Assyrians because they have been in
Iraq, contributed culturally, and maintained a cohesive identity for as long
as the Kurds, if not longer.
D.

ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF AUTONOMY

Other arguments exist to support some degree of autonomy as well.
One is that granting autonomy to Assyrians would help to promote democratic stability.2 31 In other words, by honoring a minority with a viable claim
to partial self-governance, the democratic system becomes stronger as a
whole. Specifically, by recognizing and protecting such a right, the democratic system distributes equality and enhances full political and social participation. This could potentially have the effect of mitigating the majoritarianism that stifles the exercise of self-determination and the flourishing
of democracy.232
Advocates of autonomy-based proposals seemed to have had this effect in mind. Michael Youash of the Iraq Sustainable Democracy Project
urges that an Assyrian administrative region is a "a tool to help keep ethnic
and religious pluralism alive in Iraq-a key ingredient for democracybuilding. 233 Similarly, Nadia Milanova of Human Rights Without Frontiers
states that adopting a federalist scheme would "establish structures that
224.
WIGRAM, supra note 3, at 179 ("Many a mountaineer from the Assyrian districts
looks, when viewed in profile, exactly as if he had stepped down from one of the slabs in
the Assyrian galleries of the British Museum.").
...

225.
226.
227.

See discussion supra Part I.A.
See discussion supra Part II.A-B.

See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 23, at 43.

228.
See discussion supra Part II.A-B.
229.
See discussion supra Part I.A.
230.
This is not to say that Assyrians are seeking a form of political autonomy identical to the Kurds. It shows simply that the same right to self-determination that underlies the
Kurdish exercise of autonomy would similarly justify-at the very least-an Assyrian claim
to heightened self-administration. The analogy also invokes an argument based on equality,
which says, essentially, it is unfair to say Kurds possess the right to self-determination, but
not Assyrians, when virtually identical objective self-determination features justify them
both.
231.
See Mutua, supra note 190, at 945-46.

232.
233.

See Mutua, supra note 190, at 945-46.
Youash, supra note 182, at 12.
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would mitigate ethnic
divisions and will institutionalize moderation in the
234
state's governance."
A second argument for autonomy-based exercises of selfdetermination is that they can provide a needed protective and safety-based
measure. 235 Such implementations can reverse the tide of flight due to persecution and insulate a vulnerable population from continuous attacks and
credible fear of genocide in the future.2 36 Though such persecution can be
linked to the enhancement of a self-determination claim, it need not be.2 37
Discussing the function of self-determination as a method of promoting
peace by resolving ethnic tension, Paul Clark points to the fact that often,
such a group's right "receives little or no support from the international
community until a genocide or ethnic cleansing is well under way., 238 In
contrast, protective measures must be implemented prior to such a scenario. 239 Clark sees the implementation of self-determination in such a context as highly compatible with autonomy regimes.24 ° Contrary to fragmenting states, federal autonomy may promote state sovereignty so long as "the
level of autonomy ensures that minorities feel they can protect themselves
(for example, by having their own local court system and law enforcement).",241 Thus, Assyrians should be placed in a position of economic and
social support so that they can provide for their own present and future security. This is extraordinarily important because the present indications of
treatment suggest a harsh future reality in the absence of viable democratic
governance.24 2
A third argument is that autonomy offers a practical solution to support economic equity. The economic viability of Assyrian enclaves in Iraq
remains a strong consideration in the grant of some measure of autonomy
because the exercise of self-determination is strongly linked to control over
economic resources.243 For instance, the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples states in article 26 that indigenous peoples have the right
to the lands and resources that they have traditionally occupied and they can

IN

234.
HuMAN RIGHTS WImOuT FRONTIERS INT., THE CHALDO ASSYRIAN COMMUNITY
TODAY'S IRAQ: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
14 (2003), available at

http://www.hrwf.net/reports/ext/IraqMissionReportNovO3.pdf.
235.
Paul A. Clark, Note, Taking Self-Determination Seriously: When Can Cultural
and PoliticalMinorities Control Their Own Fate?, 5 CH. J. INT'L L. 737, 738-39 (2005).
236.
See discussion supra Part I.B.
237.
Clark, supra note 235, at 745.
238.
Clark, supra note 235, at 739.
239.
Clark, supra note 235, at 739.
240.
Clark, supra note 235, at 750.
241.
Clark, supra note 235, at 750.
242.
See discussion supra Part I.B.
243.
ICCPR, supra note 71, art. 1.

20081

THE URGENT REA WAKENING OF THE ASSYRIAN QUESTION

use or develop them. Moreover, indigenous peoples have access to the
"ways and means for financing their autonomous functions."' "
E.

CRITICISMS AND RESPONSES

Not all support autonomy-based proposals such as the Nineveh Plains
Resolution. Many have criticized it as a ploy of Christian politicians and
religious leaders who seek their own political and economic power.245 Far
from bringing ethnic stability and tolerance to Iraq, dissenters assert that
autonomy proposals will simply further divide the community in a national246
ist-driven attempt to restore a lost empire. Critics claim that it is an en247
They suggest that those who advocate
deavor founded on ethnocentrism.
only
exaggerate the toll of the war on Asnot
as
paramount
such solutions
resulting in more persecution.
the
problem,
exacerbate
but
actually
syrians,
Autonomy plans have been denounced and branded by the Archbishop of
Kirkuk as creating an "Assyrian Ghetto" and a trap for Christians who
should fulfill their religious mission through integration and interfaith dialogue, rather than through separation.24 8
Such criticisms have been responded to as mischaracterizations because they attempt to defeat the issue by narrowing it to a religious one and
dismiss it by stating that it will only instigate further ethnic and religious
tension. 249 However, these criticisms ignore the fact that current efforts to
advance Assyrian status are grounded in longstanding efforts to promote
and advance ethnic awareness. 250 Furthermore, such denouncements misconceive some form of self-governance as rigid and exclusive. 25' But, to the
contrary, advocates highlight the fact that there is an integral part for
Turkomen, Yezidis, and Armenians on the Nineveh Plain as well because
they are also enumerated minorities in article 125.252
Similarly, counteradvocates conflate a proper conceptual understanding of autonomy. They argue that because the word autonomy is used, it
Indigenous Declaration, supra note 118, art. 4.
244.
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necessarily must imply exclusive territoriality. While there is a territorial
element at play, heightened self-administration at the same time can transcend physical territorial units. It is the group's distinction as a people that
qualifies it.
Another severe shortcoming of such critiques stems from the fact that
they virtually ignore the language of article 125 and the corresponding federally-based remedies that have been progressively recognized under international law.253 In this regard, the primary purpose of expanded selfadministration is not to serve as a basis of differentiation and to isolate Assyrians from other Iraqis. 4 Rather, because Assyrians are already different
from their surrounding population and have a unique set of fears and concerns, now and historically, the purpose of expanded self-administration is
that their claims are recognized and protected in the right of selfdetermination.255 Thus, while these criticisms may have some appeal, they
are not legally grounded and cannot detract from the body of rights that
support autonomy-based claims.
V.

CONCLUSION

The smoke now begins to clear from Iraq. Still, the situation for Assyrians in Iraq remains a ripe and highly complex dilemma that continues to
demand a response.256 The fate of "administrative rights" and any autonomy-based solutions that accompany them will work their way out through
the Iraqi political process, continued advocacy at the international level, and
also through the dialogue and efforts of the Assyrian community itself. The
hope here is to argue that federally-based autonomy solutions are both legal, and may, in fact, be compelled under international and Iraqi law. The
further purpose is to show how many of the present problems such as flight,
persecution, and societal inequality potentially can be solved by appealing
to the body of self-determination rights. Admittedly, many practical details
of the proposals and their implementations have been left unaddressed. The
broader goal, however, is to highlight the modern reemergence of the Assyrian Question, and to show how it relates to a longer story of Assyrian
253.
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254.
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255.
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256.
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suffering and pleading for recognition-it is a plight generally unknown,
yet one deeply ingrained into the hearts of the Assyrian people.
PAUL A. ISAAC*

VI.
A.

APPENDIX

MAP OF THE SUGGESTED ASSYRIAN ADMINISTRATIVE AREA IN THE
NINEVEH GOVERNATE
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Figure 1: This map depicts the suggested location of the Assyrian Administrative Area in the Nineveh Governate. Chaldean, Map of the Assyrian Administrative Area Suggested in 2005, in WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Assyrianadministartedareasuggestion
2005.jpg#file (last visited Nov. 1, 2008) (this map is reproduced in accordance
with
a
license
granted
by
the
creator,
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/legalcode).
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